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Considering Swiss Neutrality in
World War One: Ideas,
Successes, and Failures
by Brian Wages

At first glance, the Fifteenth Century Swiss ascetic Niklaus von Flue
and George Washington have only their distinguished military service
in common. Yet they share something far more important to contemporary citizens of the United States and Switzerland. They were early
proponents of their respective nations' views on neutrality and vocal
advocates of avoiding foreign influences, alliances, and payments. 1 For
international observers, Swiss neutrality is a universal constant and the
nation is quickly approaching two hundred years of uninterrupted neutrality. The continued success of the Swiss people in preserving their
neutrality while faced by considerable challenges and fearsome foes, is
a model for many nations. The example provided by the Swiss during
the First World War on how to remain neutral despite popular inclinations and external pressures toward choosing one side over the other is
one that should be considered by peaceable nations today.
Surrounded by belligerents on every side, Switzerland was often
described as an island in the midst of a sea of war. This paper considers Swiss neutrality during World War One in three ways . The first is
the relative lack of serious examination of neutrality by English speaking researchers. Second, the Swiss created a sense of armed neutrality
and this idea was the foundation for their continued neutrality. Third,
the Swiss, despite being in the closest proximity to the principal warring parties and theaters of war, succeeded in preserving their neutrality
while the United States failed . The advantages of governmental organi-

1

James Murray Luck, A History of Switzerland: The First 100,000 Years: Before
the Beginnings to the Days of the Present (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of
Science and Scholarship , 1985), pp. 125-26.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

1

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 47 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
June 2011 SAHS Review
18

zation and the dangers of personality politics is a matter of grave import
to politicians and political scientists when considering how one nation
succeeded in maintaining neutrality.
The fact that Switzerland had preserved its neutrality for nearly a
hundred years before the outbreak of the war in 1914 and has continued
to preserve it for another hundred since is impressive. Legal scholar
Malborne Graham points out in his insightful survey of neutrality in the
Great War, "Neutrality ... was a temporary expedient, a frail structure
of compromise and concession erected in the midst of a very imperfect
society of nations." 2 While having national aspiration for centuries, the
Swiss in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries would have to approach the preservation of its neutrality differently than any other before them.
"The outbreak of the French Revolution and the invasion of Switzerland effectively nullified all treaties of assistance and mutual declarations of lasting friendship and neutrality that existed between the
French monarchy, other Powers and the Swiss Confederation.'' 3 Previous to and through the Napoleonic Era, nations seeking to remain
neutral had done so by relying on the good graces of the warring parties. "With the violation of treaties of guarantee such as protected the
... neutralized states ... of Europe came a realization that the theory of
neutralization did not stand the test of actual international conflict and
that in so far as the law of neutrality concerned neutralized states, its
provisions had been entirely overthrown.''4
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the victorious powers
clearly did not want the Swiss Confederation to remain a part of the
French realm, nor did they seek to divide it amongst themselves. The
plenipotentiaries in the peace negotiations pressed the cantons to again
be independent. 5 Given the historical and at times gradual development
of the Swiss conception of neutrality in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, it is hardly surprising that the Congress at Vienna sought to
guarantee the Confederation's sovereignty and neutrality. 6
2

Malborne W. Graham. "Neutrality in the World War." The American Journal of
International Law, 17 (Oct. 1923):4, p. 704 .
3
Luck , A History of Switzerland, p. 296 .
4
Graham, "Neutrality in the World War," p. 705.
5
Luck, A History of Switzerland, p. 322.
6
Ibid , pp. I 62-168 , 194-198 .

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/3

2

Wages: Considering Swiss Neutrality In World War One
Considering Swiss Neutrality in World War One

19

Swiss Cavalry patrolling the frontier in 1917.
Courtesy: Library of Congress .

During the Congress of Vienna, the idea of enforced neutrality was
raised. The Duke of Dalberg, a representative of France, stated "It is
necessary to close this country entirely and to protect it completely from
war. Switzerland ought to be everybody's Fatherland." 7 The participants
7

Ibid, p. 328.
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of the congress sought to ensure, possibly by force if necessary, the
preservation of Swiss neutrality. Yet, it was the Swiss who began to develop the idea of armed neutrality through the Nineteenth Century. This
is not so unusual an idea considering the martial and mercenary nature
of many cantons throughout history. It finally found expression in the
Twentieth Century.
Annually, several hundred monographs relating to the First World
War are published in English and among this number are a few dealing
in some way to the Swiss. A survey of these works reveals that most
of the research focuses on the economic activity of Switzerland. Often
these works compare the First and Second World War economies and associated foreign relations. Another relatively frequent topic of research
is the impact of the Allied blockade on the Central Powers and whether
the Swiss played a role in circumventing it. Despite a number of charges
that the Swiss profited from the blockade, serious research reveals that
the longer the blockade continued the worse the Swiss economy became, most notably in foodstuffs. And in this context, it is also important to touch on the role the Allies played in relieving the crisis in food
supplies. 8
Perhaps the most common references to Switzerland during the
First World War center on its role as a meeting ground for peace overtures, propaganda ploys, intrigues by spies, and the ex-patriots who were
often political agitators . Of interest is the role of ambassadorial ministers in floating peace proposals between the warring parties, none of
which succeeded. Exciting stories of spies and other nefarious persons
occupy a number of these works. Finally, there were so many nationals
from the warring nations who sought refuge in the peaceful Alpine nation that they make good subject matter for research. "The neutrality of
no other country was made to serve the humane needs of all the belligerents as that of Switzerland. Monarchs, statesmen, philosophers, artists,
and socialists who could not approve of war, retired into Switzerland,
from all countries, where they found security and peace." 9 An interesting one of these is that "Swiss socialist leaders offered their country as

8
D. D. Driscoll, Anglo-Swiss Relations 1914-1918: With Special Reference to the
Allied Blockade of the Central Powers (London: University of London , 1968).
9
William Stanley Braithwaite. The Story of the Great War (New York: Frederick
A . Stokes Company, 1919), p. 107.
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a meeting-point for the conspirators of Europe, notably from Germany
and Russia" of which the Lenin "sealed train" is but the most prominent
example. 10 These two elements of the war relating to the Swiss are in
marked contrast to the general lack of interest in political and diplomatic neutrality of the state. However these events and people hold our
attention, they tended to relate less with the Swiss and more with the
extra-national resident. Location seems more of an afterthought or colorful background.
The relatively few studies in English of Swiss neutrality are in
contrast to the continued and extensive interest in other languages, particularly in German. Not surprisingly, some valuable published research
is being done in German. 11 At the same time the vast majority of references to Switzerland in English accounts of the war touch on front line
stretched from the Alps to the English Channel. 12 The relative lack of
serious treatment of Swiss neutrality in World War One creates a gap
in the scholarship of the period and overlooks the role played by this
neutral actor.
As the war opened, "The Federal Council decided, on 3 August
1914, that the situation was serious enough to warrant taking exceptional measures. It got the Federal Assembly to grant it full powers,
which were renewed on several occasions and did not end till long after
peace was declared." 13 Yet despite the ability for a wider latitude in decision making and perhaps taking the nation closer to one group of warring states or the other, the council continued to demure. Their political
organization led to a greater sense of community and reticence to drag
others into a devastating war even if popular sympathy favored one side
over another.
In retrospect, the mobilization of Swiss forces in 1914 may have
been the single greatest action to preserve its neutrality. As the historian
Edgar Bonjour expressed, "War-like activity can spur the defensive will,

° Christopher

1

Hughes. Switzerland (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1975), p.

112.
11
Max Mittler. Der Weg zum Ersten Weltkrieg : Wie Neutral war die Schwiez?
(Zurich: Verlag Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2003) .
12
Just one of many examples can be found in Jay Winter, The Great War: And the
Shaping of the 20th Century. (New York: Penguin Studio, 1996) , pp . 99,210 .
13
William Martin . Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present (New York :
Praeger, 1971 ), p. 257.
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Ulrich Wille, Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army in World War I.
Courtesy: Wikipedia .

while inactivity, often felt as a denial of heroism, in the long run wears
men down." 14 It was this ideal that led the Federal Council to act and
act quickly. With nearly a century of ideological preparations, this act
of defensive will fell on the army. "The mobilization on August 3 of the
entire army of nearly 250,000 men went without a hitch." 15 By the time
the Germans began their march across Belgium, "The army [consisting] of 142,999 regulars and 91,809 Landwehr" with a "total, 231,808
men of all arms" were stationed along the frontier. 16 "The north-west of
Switzerland bordering France and Germany was the area most vulnerable to attack; and it was here on the line of the Jura from Basel to Les
Rangiers that three Swiss divisions were concentrated, with three more
held in reserve." 17
14
Edgar Bonjour. Swiss Neutrality: Its History and Meaning (London : George
Allen and Unwin, 1946), p. 108 .
15
Georg Thurer, Free and Swiss: the Story of Switzerland (Coral Gables , Florida:
University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 142.
16
Kelly Miller. Kelly Miller's History of the World War for Human Rights (New
York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 284.
17 Thurer, Free and Swiss, p. 144.
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Command of the Swiss army fell to the Prussian trained Ulrich
Wille. "In time of peace, there is no general officer in command of the
Swiss army, the highest rank being that of colonel. When mobilization
was decided upon, the Federal Council elected Colonel Ulrich Wille,
general and commander-in-chief." 18 A colorful figure, Wille commanded the army throughout the war, but not without controversy. In 1915
he advocated joining the Central Powers, a move that earned him the
enmity of many French-speaking Swiss. 19 Despite this event, his leadership preserved the difficult morale of the army whose central task was
waiting for frontier violations. In all, about one thousand incursions
occurred and "Four-fifths of the [those] violations of the Swiss frontiers
during the war were due to over-flights, and the powers made no direct
threat of invasion." 20
The fear of invasion drove Wille to move the bulk of his forces
to the region around the French and German borders. A contemporary
observer acknowledged the very real fear of invasion when he described
"Switzerland, like the other small states, was 'extremely anxious' as to
its position in the event of a European conflict. ... [but] so far is known,
no power contemplated violating the neutrality of Switzerland." 21 This
acknowledgement that no power actually planned on invasion reduces
the argument that armed neutrality deterred invasion.
The states surrounding the Alpine nation each took steps in the
case Swiss neutrality was violated by a hostile state (an example being when Italy stationed a number of troops along its northern border
in 1915 to forestall an invasion by Germany through Swiss territory). 22
However, none of these fears were realized. The evidence is that none
of the general staffs in each of the nations entertained any plans to cross
Swiss territory.
Even though there were no actual plans to invade Switzerland,
many believed an invasion could occur and contemporary events did
18
Henry J. Reilly. Why Preparedness: the Observations of an American Army
Officer in Europe, 1914-1915 (Chicago: Daughaday and Co., 1916), p. 147.
19
Hans Rudolf Fuhrer and Paul Meinrad Strassle. General Ulrich Wille: Vorbild
den Einen - Feindbild den Anderen (Zi.irich: Neue Zi.ircher Zeitung, 2003).
20
Thurer, Free and Swiss , p. 145.
21
Bernadotte E. Schmitt. The Coming of the War, 1914 . Volume lJ (London :
Scribners and Sons, 1930), p. 466 .
22
Pascal Trees. "Switzerland" in Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political,
Social, and Military History. Vol. 4 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), p. 1142.
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nothing to quell the fear. Indeed, Germany's "violation of the neutrality
of Belgium ... seemed to confirm these fears." 23 While many German
speaking Swiss sympathized with the Central Powers, they could not
easily dismiss the potential of a violation of their neutrality by the Germans.
With the entry of the Italians into the war in 1915, the Swiss again
feared a violation of their territorial integrity. Luigi Cadorna, Italian
field marshal and member of the general staff, in retrospect described
the possibility of invasion "at the time ... loomed large and weighed
continually like an incubus during the development of operations. They
made it necessary all the time to have in mind the possibility of Swiss
neutrality being violated and to consider measure to meet the eventuality, especially as, though remote, it would, had it materialized, have
placed the whole army suddenly in extreme danger." 24
If the Germans made no indication of invasion and the Italians had
no plans, what of the French armies? Early on in the war, the American attache in Zurich, supported the evidence that there were few indications of invasion by another power. He said, "the Germans did not
seem to feel any particular apprehension of French invasion through
Switzerland." 25 Accordingly, in a memorandum by the German Headquarters staff, "In the South, Switzerland forms an extremely solid
bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality
against France, and thus protecting our flank." 26 It is interesting to note
that the Swiss appeared to fear more an invasion from Italy or France,
while the German army thought this was unlikely. The British military
attache, Colonel Delme-Radcliffe, in Bern correctly assessed the situation when he stated, "the existing Swiss fortifications are directed exclusively against France and Italy." 27

23
E. Bonjour, H.S. Offler, and G.R. Potter. A Short History of Switzerland.
(Oxford: Cl arendon Press, 1952) , p. 344.
24
As cited in Luigi Cadorna. Altre Pagine Sulla Grande Guerra (Milan, 1925),
pp. 29-32.
25
Pleasant Alexander Stovall. Switzerland and the World War (Savannah,
Georgia: Mason Publi shers, 1939), p. 37.
26
Charles F. Horne. The Great Events of the Great War (New York: National
Alumni, 1923) , p. 131.
27
Luigi Albertini . The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University
Press , 1957),p.685.
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The idea of armed neutrality and its place in descriptions of the
war have led to the impression that it alone is the reason for Switzerland's success in preserving its neutrality. As observed in post-World
War Two, "humanitarian activities could help to create a favorable image of Switzerland in the world, but reliable security could not be gained
in this way." 28 The authors of this treatise go on to argue that neutrality
cannot be (and during World War One was not) preserved only by the
good graces of the belligerents. The Swiss found an alternative and it
was to create the neutrality and enforce it themselves .
However, this idea of armed neutrality as the only savior of the nation fails to see other factors that impacted the nation as it remained an
island surrounded by militant nations . Stanley Knight, writing shortly
after the war began, said of Switzerland, "Because of her geographical
position, her military importance is out of all proportion to the extent
of her territory or the strength of her army." 29 The real preserver of national neutrality may actually have been related to "war aims."
Any discussion of war aims is inherently difficult and controversial. This is especially true as historians consider documents and evidence not available to the principal actors at the time. These contemporaries were left to react to the intelligence available and often made
decisions based on incomplete or inaccurate sources. Many historians
stated that armed neutrality as the foundation for its success is indicative only of the information under which these assumptions were made.
However, the fact that few, if any, plans for a violation of Swiss neutrality even existed seems to have little impact on the preservation of the
idea.
As a concluding analysis of the idea of armed neutrality, Clausewitz's assertion on the correlation between war and diplomacy may
have limited application in those cases like that of Switzerland. It could
be argued that no war was waged against Switzerland because of a success in diplomatic efforts. Yet the evidence seems to be lacking for such
an argument. The interplay between the belligerent nations and Switzerland provided a balance in what they each wanted to gain and the Swiss
28
Rolf Kieser and Kurt R. Spillmann . The New Switzerland: Problems and
Policies (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1996), p.

61.
29
W. Stanley Macbean Knight. The History of the Great European War: Its
Causes and Effects (London: Caxton Pub ., 1914), p. 159 .
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people who wished to preserve their neutrality. For the parties involved,
there would have been little advantage to invasion. This is also true of
the Swiss, they saw little diplomatic advantage to choosing one side
or the other. Therefore the wisdom of the Swiss, more than their army,
enabled their continued neutrality.
An overriding success of neutrality may have lay more in the
personalities and individual choices of the belligerent powers. While
the Swiss feared an invasion and made preparations to defend against
it, there are few indications from either side that any of them anticipated a large scale violation of Swiss neutrality. This is in marked
contrast to the Second World War, when the German general staff created Operation Tannenbaum that was specifically aimed at occupying
and pacifying Switzerland. These specific plans were created at the
behest of Adolf Hitler and are in marked contrast to the civilian and
military leaders twenty five years earlier who did not anticipate such
a move .
With the considerable number of neutral nations when the First
World War began, it is intriguing to note how that number decreased
year by year as the war unfolded. The success of Swiss neutrality in
comparison to the United States failure may be an indication of political
organization and the power of personality in leading nations into war.
If this is the case, the success of neutrality in any era has considerably
less to do with proximity, or even popular sympathy.
When comparing the personalities
of the presidents of each nation, there are
similarities and differences. Arthur Hoffmann, president of Switzerland when the
war began, energetically gave extensive
powers to Wille to defend the nation and
preserve neutrality. Woodrow Wilson,
an early advocate of peace in Europe,
shared the neutral stance of the Swiss
for much of the first two years of war.
Indeed, "Wilson's peace note of DecemArthur Hoffmann,
President of Swiss
ber 18 to all the belligerents. This peace
effort of Wilson was supported by [the]
Confederation, 1914.
Courtesy: Swiss Federal Council.
Swiss" government, but ultimately came
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to nothing. 30 However, two events illustrate how different the two men
were in preserving, or failing to preserve their respective nation's neutrality.
In 1917, Arthur Hoffmann, then a member of the federal council,
was involved with an associate, Robert Grimm, who made overtures to
the Russian government that "Germany would be interested in a peace
agreement." 3 1 The event reveals Hoffmann's attempt to shorten the war
and his own leanings toward a victory for the Central Powers. His resignation was swift and helped to defuse the situation. It also revealed the
overriding opinions of the Swiss. Neutrality, despite personal feeling,
was the overriding concern.
Woodrow Wilson, once a passionate advocate for American neutrality, faced a similar challenge with the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. While the events leading to the American
declaration of war are complex, the president's role is hard to minimize.
He seems to have accepted the interesting portend for the future by
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in 1904. The Americans "have inherited the role,
which, until recently, Britain played in the world" .32 This was a perception of America that in the course of World War One they were to accept
and become a bastion of democracy. It is also a view that would extend
well beyond the early years of the twentieth century.
When it is considered how many were involved in the fighting
around the world during World War One, the mere fact that Switzerland
maintained its neutrality throughout the conflagration is a commendable
success. While many other nations began the war with declarations of
neutrality, the Swiss did not fall into the traps others did . They did this
despite being completely surrounded. Yet there remains a relative dearth
of English research on the topic. This can be rectified with an increased
awareness of the benefits to be gained by such a scholarly endeavor.
The idea of armed neutrality, while integral in its day, was not the only
reason the Swiss succeeded. There are many other factors involved, an
understanding of which can provide a template for preserving peace
30

Bernadotte E. Schmitt. The World in the Crucible: 1914-1919 (New York :
Harper and Row, 1984) , p. 464.
31
James Murray Luck, ed . Modern Switzerland. (Palo Alto: Society for the
Promotion of Science and Scholarship , 1978), p. 422.
32 Leroy-Beaulieu , Paul. Les Etats-Unis au XXe siecle. (Paris, 1904), xxii , 4 I 623.
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and neutrality even today. A primary factor is to avoid the power of personality in driving nations toward conflict in the first place. The Swiss
succeeded for many reasons, not the least of which was governmental
organization and diffusion of power amongst many personalities rather
than a few or even one. Such considerations can create a more peaceful world. The application of such ideas can mark the start of the third
hundred years of Swiss neutrality.
- Brian Wages, Brigham Young University
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